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This experiment studies the internal and external effects of communication in a multi-
level trust game. In this trust game, the first player can send any part of his endowment to the 
second player. The amount sent gets tripled. The second player decides how much to send to the 
third player. The amount is again tripled, and the third player then decides the allocation among 
the three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second 
players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. When we allow 
communication only between the second and third players, the amounts sent and returned 
between these two increase. The new interesting finding is that there are external effects of 
communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 60% more and receives 
140% more than in the no communication treatment. As a result, social welfare and efficiency 
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Trust and reciprocity play important roles in economic interactions. The most frequently 
used measure of trust and reciprocity is based on a two-player trust game, proposed by Berg et al. 
(1995). In this game, the first player receives an endowment and can send any portion of it to the 
second player. The amount sent gets tripled. The second player then decides how much to send 
back. The first player is said to be trusting if he sends any positive amount to the second player. 
The second player is said to be trustworthy if the amount he returns is at least as great as the 
amount he receives (McCabe et al., 2003). Berg et al. (1995), as well as many replications, show 
that most participants display trust and trustworthiness contrary to self-interested profit-
maximizing behavior (McCabe et al., 1998, 2000, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Burks et al., 2003). 
Although there is a substantial variance in the decisions made, a majority of the first players send 
positive amounts and a majority of the second players return positive amounts. And the amount 
returned is typically increasing in the amount sent.  
This study departs from the conventional two-player trust game by providing a 
framework for understanding trusting behavior in more complex environments involving direct 
and indirect interactions among multiple players. We extend the standard two-player trust game 
to a multi-level trust game by adding a third player. The three players move sequentially. The 
first player can send any portion of his endowment to the second player. The amount sent gets 
tripled. The second player then decides how much to send to the third player. The amount is 
again tripled. The third player then decides the allocation among the three players. 
The results of our experiment indicate that with no communication some trusting 
behavior takes place in the multi-level trust game even though players are randomly regrouped 
every period. When we add communication between the second and third players, the amounts  
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sent and returned between these two increase. The new interesting finding is that there are 
external effects of communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 60% 
more and receives 140% more than in the no communication treatment. As a result, social 
welfare and efficiency increase from 48% to 73%. Content analysis of the communication 
reveals that what drives the most efficient outcomes are the proposals of equal split among three 
players made by either the second or third player. The effect of this type of proposals is strong 
enough to overcome tendencies toward collusion between the second and third players.  
The multi-level trust game studied in this paper captures both direct and indirect trust and 
reciprocity, which are commonly observed in real life. For example, the fund of funds (FoFs) 
industry where the manager of a mutual fund company invests in other mutual funds instead of 
individual securities has attracted a lot of publicity over the past few years (Gregoriou, 2003; 
Nicholas, 2004). Our game closely resembles the FoFs environment where, we have individual 
investor who has the opportunity to invest any amount of her endowment in Mutual Fund A. 
Manager of Mutual Fund A can invest in another Mutual Fund B any amount of his own 
endowment plus the invested amount by individual investors. Manager of Mutual Fund B finally 
decides how to allocate the return of total investment among the three parties. Since FoFs 
managers are specialized in assessing hedge funds and have access to better information and 
better funds, FoFs provide an efficient and cost-effective way for individual investors to access a 
diversified group of hedge funds. This efficiency cannot be achieved without FoFs because the 
majority of these funds have minimum investment requirements and thus are closed to individual 
investors.  
The multi-level trust game also allows us to study the internal and external effects of 
communication in a group when only a subgroup is allowed to communicate. In the FoFs 
example, managers of mutual funds frequently communicate with each other about investments  
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and returns on investments, establishing a “closer relationship”. As a result, a strong possibility 
of collusion arises between manager of Mutual Fund A and manger of Mutual Fund B. This 
could cause an adverse effect on the level of trust that individual investors might have on 
managers.
1  Would communication between managers of mutual funds have any effect on 
managerial decisions and investment decisions of individual investors who don’t get the first 
hand information about the conversation?
2 Our experiment helps to answer these questions. To 
examine internal effects of communication, we measure trust and reciprocity among group 
members who communicate with each other. To examine the external effects of communication, 
we analyze the behavior of those who are left out of the communication. 
Our multi-level trust game is related to the three-player centipede game studied by 
Rapoport et al. (2003) and Murphy et al. (2004).
3 The three-player centipede game is a multi-
stage trust game which can be used to address some aspects of indirect trust (Camerer 2003). 
Yet, the strategy space of each player in the three-player centipede game is restricted to a binary 
choice, whether to end the game and take some percentage of the available surplus, or to increase 
the surplus and allow other players a chance to end the game. Thus, it allows observing only 
whether indirect trust exists but not the magnitude of indirect trust. The multi-level trust game 
proposed in this study is general enough to capture both the degrees of direct and indirect trust 
                                                 
1 A typical readers’ response from Harvard Professor James Heskett’s column article “Is This the Twilight Era for 
the Managed Mutual Fund?”  is “As a small individual investor, I feel powerless to control or even understand how 
my mutual funds operate. I believe fund managers generally have others' interests, including their own, ahead of 
mine. Most importantly, I am skeptical of the ability of fund managers to consistently beat the market”. 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/3825.html 
2 Another example of multi-level trust game can be found in the workplace. In some companies, a CEO determines 
the bonus for a manager and his workers. When workers decide how much effort to exert, they must not only trust 
their manager to report their performance truthfully to the CEO, but also trust that the CEO will reward them 
appropriately. It is also often the case that the detailed discussions the CEO and managers have in the board room 
are often not revealed to workers or delivered as second hand information via managers to workers. 
3 In a repeated three-player centipede game, Rapoport et al. (2003) find that neither full cooperation nor full non-
cooperation is supported. In a mixed population of human players and robots, Murphy et al. (2004) find that there is 
an increase in the propensity of human players to cooperate over time when a handful of cooperative robots are 
added while adding a handful of non-cooperative robots does not change the cooperation rate.  
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and reciprocity by using a continuous strategy space for each player. Moreover, our game gives 
us the flexibility to analyze different communication channels and we focus on the external 
effects of communication in this paper which is new to the communication literature.  
 
2. Multi-Level Trust Game 
We introduce a new version of a trust game – a multi-level trust game (Figure 2.1). This 
is a three-player trust game, where player 1 acts as a trustor, player 2 embodies both trustor’s and 
trustee’s characteristics, and player 3 always acts as a trustee. All players 1, 2, and 3 are 
endowed with e1, e2, and e3. Player 1 can send a portion α12 of his endowment e1 to player 2. The 
amount sent by player 1 is multiplied by k1. Then player 2 can send a portion α23 of his total 
income to player 3. The amount sent by player 2 is multiplied by factor k2. Then player 3 can 
reciprocate to players 1 and 2 by sending back portions of the total money received (α31 > 0 and 
α32 > 0), where α32 measures the amount of direct reciprocity and α31 measures the amount of 
indirect reciprocity. 
Figure 2.1 – Multi-Level Trust Game 
 
The unique Nash equilibrium in the multi-level trust game, which assumes that all players 
maximize their earnings, is for all players to send nothing. By backwards induction, player 2 
knows that a rational player 3 will not send anything back (α32= α31 =0) and therefore player 2 






In this multilateral setting, if player 1 sends any positive amount (α12 > 0), it means he is willing 
to take a risky bet that both players 2 and 3 will reciprocate. In other words, player 1 exhibits 
direct trust in player 2 and indirect trust in player 3. It is riskier to trust in this game than in the 
two-player game because player 1 is repaid by player 3 and not by player 2. Therefore, player 1 
has to trust that player 2 will pass the money to player 3 and also trust that player 3 will be 
trustworthy. The most efficient outcome is when both players 1 and 2 fully trust player 3 by 
sending all of their endowments. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Hypothesis 
We conducted an experiment in which each session had two treatments: a no 
communication treatment (NC) and a communication treatment (C). Both treatments lasted for 
10 periods. After completing all 20 decision periods, 4 periods were randomly selected for 
payment (2 periods for each treatment). In the NC treatment, all subjects were randomly assigned 
to a specific role, designated as player 1, player 2, or player 3. Each subject remained in the same 
role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period, each player was endowed with 
e1 = e2 = e3 = 100 experimental francs and was randomly regrouped with two other players to 
form a three-player group, with each player in a different role. Player 1 made a decision on how 
many francs between 0 and 100 to send to player 2 and how many francs to keep. Each franc sent 
by player 1 was tripled (k1 = 3). After players 2 and 3 learned the amount of francs sent by player 
1, player 2 then made a decision on how many francs to send to player 3. The amount sent by 
player 2 was also tripled (k2 = 3). Finally, player 3 made a decision on how many francs to send 
back to player 1, how many francs to send back to player 2, and how many francs to keep. All 
subjects were told that player 1, player 2, and player 3 can send some, all, or none of the francs  
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available to them. At the end of each period, the amounts sent and returned by all players were 
reported for everyone to see. Instructions, available in Appendix I, explain the structure of the 
game in detail.  
We applied the same design to the C treatment except that, after player 1 made his 
decision, player 2 and player 3 were able to communicate for 90 seconds in a text based “chat 
room”. Communication took place only after players 2 and 3 learned the decision made by player 
1. Subjects were told that only players 2 and 3 would see the messages. In sending messages 
back and forth, we requested subjects to be civil to each other and not to reveal their identities. 
Previous studies have shown that subjects care about treating others fairly (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000), they display trust and trustworthiness contrary to self-interested profit-
maximizing behavior (Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 1998), they are concerned about 
efficiency (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), and they have unconditional other-regarding 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cox, 2004). In evolutionary 
literature it is found that people exhibit direct and indirect trust in other people (Buchner et al., 
2004; Greiner and Levati, 2005).
4 Based on these observations we conjecture that players 1 and 2 
will trust player 3 by sending positive amounts. It is also documented in a two-player trust game 
that the levels of direct trust and reciprocity are higher than the levels of indirect trust and 
reciprocity (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Guth et al., 2001; Seinen 
                                                 
4 Greiner and Levati (2005) use a variant of a trust game in order to implement a cyclical network of indirect 
reciprocity where the first individual may help the second, the second help the third, and so on until the last, who in 
turn may help the first. Like in a two-player trust game, the authors find that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual 
trust in the multi-player environment. Buchner et al. (2004) compare the trust-reciprocity regimes with the explicit 
incentive schemes in the context of a 3-person ultimatum game. They find that mutual trust is as good as incentive 




5 Therefore, we expect that player 2 will trust more than player 1. And player 
3 will reciprocate to player 2 more than to player 1.  
We base our hypothesis of the effects of communication in the multi-level trust game on 
previous findings in the communication literature. Several experimental studies of one-shot two-
player trust games show that cheap talk communication increases cooperation between trustor 
and trustee (Glaeser et al., 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Buchan et al., 2006; Ben-Ner 
et al., 2009).
6 Communication also improves cooperation in prisoner dilemma games (Wichman, 
1972), public good games (Isaac and Walker, 1988), common-pool resource games (Hackett et 
al., 1994), and voting experiments (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996; Zhang, 2009). Social 
psychologists have identified several means by which communication can increase cooperation: 
communication creates group identity, thus improving group welfare, and communication elicits 
commitments, creating a promise-keeping norm (Bornstein 1992, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 
1994 and Bicchieri 2002). In our multi-level trust game communication occurs between players 2 
and 3. Thus, players 2 and 3 should identify each other as in-group members, while categorizing 
player 1 as an out-group. According to social identity theory, group members tend to favor the 
                                                 
5  Dufwenberg et al. (2001) perform an experiment based on a trust game with direct and indirect reciprocity 
treatments. By allowing receivers to reciprocate towards the other donors, they find that indirect reciprocity induces 
only insignificantly smaller donations than direct reciprocity and that receivers are more rewarding in the case of 
indirect reciprocity. Guth et al. (2001) find that indirect reward reduces significantly mutual cooperation compared 
to the direct reward. In the same line of research, Seinen and Schram (2006) and Wedekind and Milinski (2000) 
provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity in “repeated helping game” developed by Nowak and 
Sigmund (1998). In this game, donors decide whether or not to provide costly help to the recipients they are matched 
with, based on information about the recipient’s behavior in encounters with third parties. 
6 Ben-Ner et al. (2009) find that trust and trustworthiness are increased when verbal communication is allowed. 
Similarly, Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009) find that verbal communication helps subjects to reach agreement even 
without visual or auditory contact. In these two studies, two-way communication is implemented. That is, both 
trustor and trustee can exchange pre-play messages. Glaeser et al. (2000) permit face to face communication before 
playing trust games. They find that when individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness increase. 
They conclude that trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the 
experiments. Buchan et al. (2006) allow subjects to engage in personal but not task-relevant communication before 
playing trust games and find significant increase of trust and trustworthiness. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) 
allow either trustor or trustee, but not both, to send free-form messages in a binary trust game. They find that the 
messages sent by trustees increase both trust and trustworthiness. However, no such effect is found when only 
trustors can send messages.  
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in-group at the expense of the out-group members. This finding is supported by many social 
psychology experiments.
7  Therefore, one should expect that with communication, player 2 
exhibits more trust, by sending more to player 3, and player 3 exhibits more trustworthiness to 
player 2, by sending back larger proportions of his endowment. On the other hand, the out-group 
player 1 should contribute less to player 2 considering the possible collusion formed between 
players 2 and 3 via communication. 
To test the conjectures raised in this study, we conducted an experiment which involved 
72 undergraduate student subjects from Purdue University. The computerized experimental 
sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran two NC-C sessions, in which a total 
of 36 subjects were engaged in 10 interactions with no communication and then 10 interactions 
with communication. The other 36 subjects participated in two C-NC sessions, where we 
reversed the order of the treatments.
8 After completing all 20 decision periods, 4 periods were 
randomly selected for payment (2 periods for each treatment). The earnings were converted into 
US dollars at the rate of 100 francs to $1. On average, subjects earned $16 each and the 
experiment session lasted for about 90 minutes. 
 
4. Results 
Table 4.1 summarizes the average amount sent and the profit earned by all players in the 
C and NC treatments. Among three players, player 1 earned the lowest profit while player 3 
earned the highest profit in the experiment. In line with our conjecture, players 1 and 2 trust 
player 3 by sending significant amounts in the NC treatment. Moreover, the level of indirect trust 
exhibited by player 1, which is represented by 43 francs sent to player 2 (43% of income), is 
                                                 
7 Social identity theory was first developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979). Chen and Li (2009) provide a detailed 
review of the literature. 
8 Two sessions (one NC-C and one C-NC) had 12 subjects and two other sessions had 24 subjects.   
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lower than the level of direct trust by player 2, which is represented by 117 francs sent to player 
3 (52% of income). Based on the estimation of a random effect model, where the dependent 
variable is the amount sent and the independent variable is a player type dummy, the difference 
is significant in absolute terms (p-value < 0.01) but it is not significant in relative to income 
terms (p-value = 0.29).
9 
Table 4.1– Summary of Average Amount Sent and Profit 
 
Table 4.2 – Communication Treatment Effects 
 
The main question posed in this study is the direct and indirect effects of communication 
on a multi-level trust game. Table 4.2 reports the estimation results of random effects models, 
where the dependent variable is the amount sent and the independent variable is a treatment 
dummy. As we expected, when communication is allowed, player 2 exhibits more trust in player 
                                                 
9 We use pooled data from C-NC and NC-C sessions in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. The order effect does not prevent 
us from drawing the conclusion that communication has significant effects on trusting behavior in our experiment. 
By using data only from the first treatment in each session (first 10 periods from C-NC and NC-C sessions) we 
receive very similar and statistically significant estimates as in Table 4.2. 
N CCN CC
P1 to P2 43 (42) 69 (41) 0.43 (0.42) 0.69 (0.41) P1 121 185 0.20 0.20
P2 to P3 117 (131) 256 (152) 0.52 (0.45) 0.84 (0.33) P2 202 324 0.33 0.34
P3 to P1 65 (161) 154 (185) 0.10 (0.19) 0.13 (0.15) P3 296 441 0.48 0.46
P3 to P2 90 (160) 274 (205) 0.14 (0.19) 0.29 (0.18)
Standard deviations are in parentheses
Decision Player
Share of      
Total Profit
Share of                
Income Sent
Amount Sent Profit
NC C NC C
Regression
(1)       
RE
(2)       
RE
(3)       
RE
(4)       
RE
(5)       
RE
(6)       
RE
(7)       
RE
(8)       
RE
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2 P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
C-treatment 25.6** 139.3** 89.6** 183.8** 0.26** 0.32** 0.04** 0.16**
  [1 if treatment is C] (3.2) (11.9) (14.4) (15.9) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant 43.1** 116.8** 64.5** 89.7** 0.43** 0.52** 0.10** 0.13**
(5.1) (14.3) (18.0) (16.6) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
In each regression we control for period, subject, and session effects
All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects
Dependent variable
Amount Sent Amount Sent Relative to Income 
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3. The average amount sent by player 2 is increased by 139 francs (specification 2). Controlling 
for the amount player 2 received from player 1, in the NC treatment player 2 sends only 52% of 
income to player 3 while this amount is increased by 32% in the C treatment (specification 6).  
How does communication affect the behavior of player 3? Table 4.1 shows that in  the 
NC treatment, player 3 returns 77% back to player 2 of the amount player 2 sent to player 3. 
When communication is introduced, player 3 returns 107% back to player 2. The same 
conclusion can be drawn about the behavior of player 3 towards player 1. With communication, 
player 3 sends higher absolute and relative amounts back to player 1. The two panels in Figure 
4.1 show that the distribution of return ratio is shifted towards more generous behavior of player 
3 in the C treatment as compared to the NC treatment. These findings provide full support for the 
conjecture that communication enhances trust and trustworthiness. 
Figure 4.1 – Distribution of Return Ratio in the NC and C Treatments 
 
Although only players 2 and 3 are allowed to communicate, we find that the amount 
player 1 sends to player 2 in the C treatment is increased by 60% (Table 4.1). In relative terms, 
player 1 sends 43% of income to player 2 in the NC treatment and 69% in the C treatment. This 
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treatment because communication would serve as a collusion device between players 2 and 3. In 
fact, we find evidence that communication increases the collusion between players 2 and 3. In 
the C treatment, player 3 sends half of his income to player 2 and nothing to player 1 in around 
10% of the instances. In the NC treatment, this number is less than 1%, indicating much lower 
collusion. Then the question is why would communication increase the trust level of player 1? 
The answer turns out to be very simple. In the NC treatment, player 3 splits the income equally 
between three players around 5% of the instances. In the C treatment, this rate is around 25%. 
Therefore, in the C treatment, player 1 receives 140% more than in the NC treatment. This 
means that communication has two opposite effects on the amount player 3 sends to player 1: it 
enhances collusion between players 2 and 3, and it also activates fairness norms and thus 
increases cooperation between all players.
10  The cooperation effect dominates the collusion 
effect, which is supported by estimation of specifications (3) and (7) in Table 4.2. 
 As a result of communication, all players earn higher payoffs. In the C treatment, the 
sum of total earnings is around 950, while it is 619 in the NC treatment (Table 4.1).
11 Therefore, 
the efficiency in the NC treatment is 48% (619/1300), while in the C treatment it is 73% 
(950/1300). Communication also results in more equal split of earnings between players 2 and 3. 
In the NC treatment the difference between earnings of players 2 and 3 is around 15%, while in 
the C treatment this difference is around 12%. 
We conducted a C-NC session to see whether cooperation which subjects have achieved 
during the communication treatment could be sustained when communication is removed. 
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b display the time trend of average amount sent by all players. Figure 4.2a 
suggests that communication in the C treatment indeed influences the behavior of players in the 
                                                 
7 Cason and Mui (1997) also documents that communication makes groups more altruistic than individuals in a 
dictator game.  
11 Based on the estimation of random effect models, where the dependent variable is the profit and the independent 
variable is a treatment dummy, the differences in payoffs are significant (p-value < 0.01).  
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consecutive NC treatment. The average amount sent by each player in the NC treatment is higher 
in C-NC session (Figure 4.2a) than in NC-C session (Figure 4.2b). However, this difference is 
significant only for the first 5 periods based on the estimation results of a random effect model. 
Figure 4.2a – Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in C-NC Order 
 
Figure 4.2b – Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in NC-C Order 
 
To further account for order effects, Table 4.3 reports random effects regressions of the 
amount all players sent on treatment and order variables. The variable C-treatment x NC-C is 
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treatment x C-NC is equal to 1 if treatment is C and the order in which treatments were run is C-
NC. The p-values at the bottom of Table 4.3 indicate that order has a significant effect on the 
behavior of all players.
12 In particular, communication is more effective in NC-C sessions than in 
C-NC sessions. A possible explanation is that in NC-C sessions, after 10 periods of the NC 
treatment, subjects understand better the efficiency cost of poor cooperation, and thus they 
significantly increase cooperation in the following C treatment. 
Table 4.3 – Order Effect 
 
 
5. Beliefs and Messages 
5.1 Beliefs 
In both C and NC treatments, after making the decision on how much to send to player 2, 
we asked player 1 to make a prediction about the actions of players 2 and 3 before seeing the 
outcome screen. Player 1 was asked to guess how much player 2 would send to player 3, how 
much player 3 would send back to player 2, and how much player 3 would send back to player 1. 
Subjects were financially motivated to make correct predictions. They were paid 10 francs for 
each prediction if the prediction differed by no more than 5% from the actual decision made. We 
                                                 
12 We used standard Wald test to see whether these two variables are significantly different from each other. 
Regression
(1)       
RE
(2)       
RE
(3)       
RE
(4)       
RE
(5)       
RE
(6)       
RE
(7)       
RE
(8)       
RE
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2 P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
C-treatment x NC-C 37.6** 178.1** 127.7** 228.8** 0.38** 0.41** 0.06** 0.18**
  [1 if C treatment and NC-C session] (4.3) (16.0) (19.4) (21.0) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
C-treatment x C-NC 13.7** 100.4** 51.4** 138.8** 0.14** 0.23** 0.02 0.14**
  [1 if C treatment and C-NC session] (4.3) (16.0) (19.4) (21.0) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 43.1** 116.8** 64.5** 89.7** 0.43** 0.52** 0.10** 0.13**
(5.2) (14.6) (18.3) (16.9) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.105 0.130
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
In each regression we control for period, subject, and session effects
All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects
Dependent variable
Amount Sent Amount Sent Relative to Income 
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chose this belief-elicitation protocol instead of the quadratic-scoring rule mainly because it is 
simple and rather easy for subjects to understand. As argued by Charness and Dufwenberg 
(2006), this form of belief elicitation sharpens the incentives in comparison with quadratic-
scoring rules. 
Table 5.1– Summary of Average Expected Amount Sent and Percentage Difference 
 
Table 5.1 reports the average predictions of player 1 on the amounts sent by player 2 and 
player 3 and the average percentage differences from the actual decisions made. On average 
player 1 makes good predictions on the amount player 2 sends to player 3 in both treatments and 
on the amount player 3 sends back to player 2 in the C treatment. However, in both C and NC 
treatments, player 1 overestimates the amount player 3 sends back to players 1.
13  This 
overestimation may partially explain the high level of trust exhibited by player 1 in the multi-
level trust game. 
 
5.2 Content Analysis of Communication 
At this point we know that communication enhances cooperation in the group of three 
people although only a subgroup of two people is allowed to communicate. This brings us to the 
question of what kinds of messages cause this cooperation. We use content analysis to answer 
this question. 
                                                 
13 We have also looked at this overestimation across periods and found that it does not disappear with experience. 
NC C NC C NC C
P2 to P3 133 265 117 256 13.9% 3.4%
P3 to P2 130 287 90 274 45.4% 4.8%
P3 to P1 101 229 65 154 56.2% 48.6%
Percentage Difference 
From Actual Decisions Decision
Expected Amount 
Sent




The procedure that we used to quantify the recorded messages is as follows. First, we 
randomly selected a session to develop a coding scheme. We classified the messages into 18 
categories, shown in Table 5.2. Then we employed two undergraduate students to code all 
messages into the coding categories independently. The unit of observation for coding was all 
messages sent out in a given period before subjects made decisions. Coders were asked not to 
start coding until they had finished reading all messages in a given period. If a unit of 
observation was deemed to contain the relevant category of content, it was coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise. Each unit was coded under as many or few categories as the coders deemed 
appropriate. The coders were not informed about any hypotheses of the study.
14 
Table 5.2 – Coding Table, Reliability Indexes, and Frequency of Coding 
 
Following Neuendorf (2002), we adopt Cohen’s Kappa K as a reliability measurement of 
the between-coder agreement. This measurement determines to which extent the coders agree 
that a certain message belongs to a particular coding category. Cohen’s reliability measurement 
                                                 







1a P2 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.53 0 21.3%
1b P2 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 0.75 0 17.9%
1c P2 proposed  to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.81 0 7.1%
1d P2 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1 0.76 0 2.7%
1e P2 made a negative comment about P1 0.50 0 6.3%
1f P2 showed trust in P3 0.37 0 4.2%
1g P2 used threat 0.39 0 2.1%
1h P2 pleaded or appealed to P3  0.53 0 9.4%
2a P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.74 0 31.5%
2b P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 0.77 0 24.2%
2c P3 proposed  to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.77 0 5.8%
2d P3 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1 0.52 0 4.6%
2e P3 made a negative comment about P1 0.50 0 4.8%
2f P3 made any promises or showed trustworthiness 0.57 0 6.3%
2g P3 mentioned about his or her good qualities 0.32 0 1.3%
3a Agreement was reached on the first proposal 0.70 0 74.8%
3b Agreement was reached on a different proposal than the first proposal 0.67 0 18.3%
3c Agreement was not reached 0.00 0.53 0.4% 
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accounts for the between-coder agreement by chance (Hayes, 2005).
15 Reliability K greater than 
zero indicates that the proportion of agreements exceeds the proportion of agreements expected 
by chance. According to Landis and Koch (1977), K between 0.4 and 0.6 corresponds to a 
moderate agreement level and K greater than 0.6 corresponds to full agreement. Table 5.2 
displays the coding scheme along with Cohen’s reliability indexes and the frequency of coding 
for the C treatment. For the vast majority of categories, K is greater than 0.5. As a result of 
infrequent coding there are few categories that have unsatisfactory agreement levels. In further 
discussions of categories we use the average of the two independent codings. Specifically, the 
value of coding is treated as 1 if two coders agree that a message belongs to a given category, 0 
if two coders agree that a message does not belong to a given category and 0.5 if the two coders 
disagree with each other. 
Table 5.3 reports the estimation results of random effect models with individual subject 
effects. The dependent variable is the amount sent by either player 2 or player 3 and the 
independent variables are various categories of messages. In all regressions we control for period 
and session effects. Specifications (1) and (2) indicate that player 2 sends more to player 3 and 
player 3 reciprocates more to player 2 when either player 2 or player 3 proposes an equal split 
between all players (categories 1b and 2b). Specification (1) also indicates that the more often 
player 3 makes promises or shows his trustworthiness to player 2, the more player 2 sends to 
player 3 (category 2f). Some typical quotes from player 3 are “send all yours, I’ll give you back 
more. I promise I won’t screw you out of anything. You can trust me”, or “I’ll double your 
money if you send me 100.” It is also important to note that the magnitude of this influence is 
very high. When player 3 sends a message which falls into category 2f then player 2, on average, 
sends an additional 72 francs to player 3. Player 3 also reciprocates by sending 99 francs more to 
                                                 
15 For binary 0 or 1 coding, agreement by chance is 50%.  
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player 2.These findings are consistent with the argument made by Charness and Dufwenberg 
(2006) that promises affect the behavior of both trustees and trustors, resulting in much higher 
cooperation. 
Table 5.3 – Random Effects Regressions on Categories of Messages 
 
Another interesting finding is that the more player 2 pleads or appeals to player 3, the less 
player 2 sends to player 3. Some typical quotes from player 2 are “don’t screw me”, “don’t be 
greedy”. Intuitively, player 2 who sends less to player 3 is the one who doesn’t trust player 3 in 
(1)         
RE
(2)         
RE
(3)         
RE
P2 to P3 P3 to P2 P3 to P1
1a P2 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  -21.15 -25.56 -102.88***
(25.24) (40.14) (29.23)
1b P2 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 132.44*** 75.37* 141.70***
(25.64) (39.51) (29.35)
1c P2 proposed  to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  36.07 21.51 -49.39
(39.72) (53.97) (40.28)
1d P2 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1 -3.92
(59.56)
1e P2 made a negative comment about P1 5.68
(44.21)
1f P2 made any promises or showed trust to P3 -20.5 87.57
(48.20) (75.05)
1g P2 used threat -80.6 -139.62
(70.95) (104.88)
1h P2 pleaded or appealed to P3  -58.99* -53.11
(32.54) (49.34)
2a P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  4.56 -9.32 -117.74***
(21.41) (36.32) (25.00)
2b P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 125.59*** 96.58*** 150.07***
(22.29) (36.53) (26.01)
2c P3 proposed  to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  50.84 88.4 -2.14
(35.89) (59.26) (44.09)
2d P3 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1 22.16
(49.42)
2e P3 made a negative comment about P1 -56.31
(38.52)
2f P3 made any promises or showed trustworthiness 72.44* 99.33
(38.83) (63.58)
2g P3 mentioned about his or her good qualities -20.96 33.28
(86.83) (144.36)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%





the first place. Therefore, pleads and appeals of player 2 may be revealing player 2’s not-trusting 
type.  
Finally, specification (3) indicates that when either player 2 or player 3 proposes to send 
nothing to player 1 then player 3 sends significantly lower amounts to player 1 (categories 1a and 
2a). On the other hand, when either player 2 or player 3 proposes an equal split between three 
players then player 3 sends significantly higher amounts to player 1 (categories 1b and 2b). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents an experimental study of a novel multi-level trust game. In this game, 
player 1 acts as a trustor, player 2 embodies characteristics of both trustor and trustee, and player 
3 always acts as the trustee. We investigate the internal and external effects of communication on 
direct and indirect trust and reciprocity. Although the multi-level trust game requires additional 
layers of trust than the standard two-player trust game, we still find a substantial level of direct 
and indirect trust in the multi-level trust game even when there is no communication. Consistent 
with other studies, we find that the level of direct trust and reciprocity is higher than the level of 
indirect trust and reciprocity. 
Regarding communication, we find that players 2 and 3 who are engaged in nonbinding 
communication exhibit more trust and trustworthiness. The most unexpected and positive result 
of our experiment is the effect communication has on player 1’s behavior. Although only players 
2 and 3 are allowed to communicate, we find that player 1’s trust increases by 60%. This is 
because communication activates stronger preference for fairness than collusion between players 
2 and 3. Expecting that, player 1 exhibits more trust in players 2 and 3. In response, player 3 
sends higher absolute and relative amounts back to player 1. Belief elicitation reveals that player  
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1 persistently overestimates the trustworthiness of player 3, which might account for the high 
level of trust exhibited by player 1 in the communication treatment. We also find that the social 
norms developed during the communication stage carry over to the no communication stage. 
However, the difference disappears after 5 periods of play. 
Finally, we use content analysis to study what kinds of messages enhance cooperation. In 
the multivariate analysis of communication, we find that the messages that significantly increase 
cooperation between players 2 and 3 are the ones that indicate player 3’s trustworthiness, and 
messages that indicate willingness to split all earnings equally.  
Our study provides evidence that economic agents exhibit direct and indirect trust in 
multi-level interactions among strangers. One mechanism that can further promote trust and 
reciprocity is communication even when only a subgroup of the economic agents can afford to 
communicate with each other. Since communication between insiders may raise the concerns of 
forming collusion at the cost of the outsiders, to better use this mechanism, insiders should 
deliver the idea that communication activates more fairness norms toward the outsiders. This 
suggests that to rebuild trust with individual investors in FoFs, managers have to send clear 
signals to investors that their interests of obtaining cooperative, fair and efficient outcomes from 
the investment are perfectly aligned. 
The findings of our experiment can also explain the emergence of many web-based 
auctions and other forms of online businesses which are built on trust and reciprocity among 
strangers (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). For example, in the wholesale eBay online auction, as 
a consumer wholesale distributor, you can buy products at an unbeatable wholesale price from 
suppliers and then set your sale price in online auctions. A good reputation on fair trade between 
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Appendix I – The Instructions for the Experiment  
Treatment (NC-C) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of multi-person strategic decision making. Various research 
agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them closely and make 
appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is francs. 
Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _100_ francs to one dollar. At the end of today’s experiment, 
you will be paid in private and in cash.   24   participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation.  
The experiment is composed of 2 parts. Each part consists of 10 decision making periods. At this time we 
proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
The first part of the experiment consists of 10  decision-making periods. The 24 participants will be 
randomly assigned into 8 three-person groups. In addition to the group assignment each participant will also be 
randomly assigned to a specific type in the group, designated as Person 1, Person 2, and Person 3. You will remain 
in the same type throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with 
two other participants to form a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group. 





During each period, you and the other two participants in your group will make choices which will 
determine your payoffs. Each period is comprised of three stages. At Stage 1 Person 1 can send to Person 2 any 
amount X between 0 and 100 francs. Amount X sent by Person 1 is multiplied by 3. At Stage 2 Person 2 can send to 
Person 3 any amount Y between 0 and 100 + 3X francs. Amount Y sent by Person 2 is multiplied by 3. At Stage 3 
Person 3 can send back to Person 1 and/or Person 2 any amount between 0 and 100 + 3Y francs. 
More specifically, Person 1, 2 and 3 are given the initial of 100 francs in their individual accounts. At 
Stage 1 Person 1 makes a decision how many francs to send to Person 2 and how many francs to allocate to his or 
her individual account, as shown on the screen below.  
 
Person 1 can send to Person 
2 any amount X between 0 
and 100 francs 
Person 2 can send to Person 3 
any amount Y between 0 and 
100 + 3X francs 
Person 3 can send back to Person 1 
and/or Person 2 any amount 
between 0 and 100 + 3Y francs 
Stage 3 
Stage 2 
amount Y sent 
by Person 2 is 
multiplied by 3 
amount X sent 
by Person 1 is 
multiplied by 3 




Decision Screen for Person 1 at Stage 1 
 
Person 1 has the opportunity to send any number of francs between 0 and 100 to Person 2’s account. Each 
franc sent by Person 1 is multiplied by 3. For example, if Person 1 sends 40 francs to Person 2, the amount received 
by Person 2 is 120 francs (40×3=120). At the end of Stage 1 Person 2 and 3 learn the decision made by Person 1 and 
the total amount of francs in all three individual accounts. 
At Stage 2 Person 2 will then decide how many francs to send to Person 3 and how many francs to 
allocate to his or her individual account. Person 2 can send any amount of francs available in his/her account at that 
time. Each franc sent by Person 2 is multiplied by 3. For example, if Person 2 sends 60 francs, the amount received 
by Person 3 is 180 francs (60×3=180). At the end of Stage 2 Person 3 and 1 learn the decisions made by Person 2 
and the total amount of francs in all three individual accounts. 
The decision screen for Person 2 is as following: 
Allocation to the 
individual account 
Allocation to 





 Decision Screen for Person 2 at Stage 2 
 
At Stage 3 Person 3 will then decide how many francs to send back to Person 1, how many francs to send 
back to Person 2, and how many francs to allocate to his or her individual account as shown in the following screen: 
 
 
Decision Screen for Person 3 
Finally, at the end of the Stage 3 the total period earnings and the decisions of all three participants in the 
group made at each stage are reported to each person as shown in the outcome screen below:  
Allocation to the 
individual account 
Allocation to 
 Person 3 
Allocation to the 
individual account 
Allocation to 
 Person 2 
Allocation to 








Once the outcome screen is displayed, please record your results for the period on your record sheet under 
the appropriate heading. 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. All three Persons in 
the group have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the francs available to them. You will remain in the 
same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with two 
other participants to from a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 10 periods for actual payment in Part 1 
using dice roll (ten-sided die with numbers from 1 to 10). You will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and 
convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your record sheet. 
Are there any questions? 
 
 
PREDICTIONS BY PERSON 1 (This part of the instructions was given only to person 1) 
You are assigned to be Person 1. After you make your decision in Stage 1, you will be asked to enter three 
predictions in Stage 2: prediction about how many francs will Person 2 send to Person 3, prediction about how many 
francs will Person 3 send back to Person 2, and prediction about how many francs will Person 3 send back to you. In 
addition to your earnings from the individual account you will be paid for the number of correct predictions you 
make. In particular, at the end of the period, we will look at the choices actually made by Person 2 and 3 you are 
paired with and compare their choices to your predictions. You will be paid 10 francs for each prediction if your 
prediction differs by no more than 5 percent from the actual decision made. If your prediction differs by more than 5 
percent from the actual decision made, you will receive 0 francs for that prediction. 





Note that since your prediction is made before you know what actual decisions are made by Person 2 and 
Person 3 you are paired with, you maximize the expected size of your prediction payoff by simply stating your true 
beliefs about what you think Person 2 and Person 3 will do. Any other prediction will decrease the amount you can 
expect to earn from your prediction payoff. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. The rules for Part 2 are exactly 
the same as the rules for Part 1.  
The only difference is that in this part of the experiment, after Stage 1, Person 2 and Person 3 will have an 
opportunity to communicate with each other in a chat window. The communication will take place only after Person 
2 and 3 have learned the decision made by Person 1. Person 2 and 3 will have 90 seconds to chat with each other 
anonymously. Although we will record the messages, only Person 2 and 3 will see them. Note, in sending messages 
back and forth we request that you follow two simple rules: (1) Be civil to each other and use no profanity and (2) 
Do not identify yourself.  
After the chat period is over, at Stage 2 Person 2 will decide how many francs to send to Person 3 and 
how many francs to allocate to his or her individual account. At the end of Stage 2 Person 3 and 1 learn the 
decisions made by Person 2 and the total amount of francs in all three individual accounts. 
At Stage 3 Person 3 will then decide how many francs to send back to Person 1, how many francs to send 
back to Person 2, and how many francs to allocate to his or her individual account.  
Finally, at the end of the Stage 3 the earnings for all three participants in the group are reported to each 
person. Please record your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading. 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. All three Persons in 
the group have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the francs available to them. You will remain in the 
same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with two 
other participants to from a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group.  
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 10 periods for actual payment in Part 2 
using dice roll (ten-sided die with numbers from 1 to 10). You will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and 
convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your record sheet. 
Are there any questions? 
 
How many francs do you predict 
Person 2 will send to Person 3? 
How many francs do you predict 
Person 3 will send back to you? 
How many francs do you predict 
Person 3 will send back to Person 2?  
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Purpose: To study how communication affects the play of the game. 
 
Game: Refer to the attached instructions for the experiment. 
 
Coding Rules:  
 
(1) The unit of observation is all messages in a given period. You should not start to code 
until you finish reading all messages in a given period. It is very important to look at the 
context of the messages across lines to properly interpret and code them.  
(2) If a unit of observation is deemed to contain the relevant category of content, enter the 
code for the category in the relevant column beside the first line of the unit.  
(3) Each unit can be coded under as many or few categories as you deem appropriate. Enter 
the additional codes in columns to the right. 
(4) You should independently code all messages. Do not discuss with anyone about which 
statements should fall into which categories. 
(5) Your job is to capture what had been said rather than why it was said or what effect it 
had. Think of yourself as a “coding machine.” 
(6) Code the sessions in the chronological order that the sessions were conducted, as 
explained and presented by your coding supervisor. 
 
Please track the time you spend on coding the messages and training. You will be paid $12 for 
each hour working on this project.  
 
Thanks a lot for your participation in the coding task! 
 